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The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes: A Short Response to Professor
Barzuza’s Delaware’s Compensation
Forthcoming, In Brief, The Online Magazine of the Virginia Law Review
M. Todd Henderson
Perhaps the most hackneyed and intractable debate in all of business law
is the one about whether Delaware has incentives to provide an optimal corporate
law, whatever that is. The world seems divided into the race-to-the-topers and
the race-to-the-bottomers, with increasing amounts of scholarship piling up on
both sides, none of which seems to be convincing the other side or moving policy
forward in a meaningful way. When asked to respond to the latest salvo in this
battle, my initial reaction was, “Oh no! Not another paper on states racing.” But
after reading Professor Michal Barzuza’s thought-provoking article – Delaware’s
Compensation – I’m convinced that there are still interesting things to be said
about the optimality of the state-as-competitor-for-charters model of modern
American corporate governance. I don’t find Professor Barzuza’s proposal for
making the franchise tax proportional to firm value convincing or necessarily
desirable, but, because of the natural check provided by state competition, it is
unlikely to do much harm.
In her words, Professor Barzuza’s thesis is as follows:
If Delaware’s [franchise] tax were more sensitive to
firm value, or if Delaware increased its tax to reflect
changes in the quality of its law, the state would have
better incentives to invest in quality, even in the
absence of competition, because Delaware would be
rewarded for such changes with higher tax
collections.1
The idea is that the current system – basically a flat fee of $165,000 for large
firms – does not provide legislators with sufficient incentives to overcome the
ability of managers to lobby for management-friendly legislation. Professor
Barzuza claims that managers dominate the process of incorporation (both at the
IPO and reincorporation stages), and that legislators rationally favor them over
shareholders, in part because the benefits from favoring managers are real and
sizable, while increasing shareholder value doesn’t do much to attract or keep
firms, and doesn’t increase the state’s take of $165,000 per firm.
Professor Barzuza’s paper makes an important point – taxes are not only a
form of regulation, but also can be an incentive to efficient regulation.2 To see

Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
1 Michal Barzuza, Delaware’s Compensation, 94 VA. L. REV. 521, 549 (2008).
2 Alternatively, one might think that taxes are a substitute for regulation, since in most
cases regulation decreases firm profitability and taxes are effectively a proxy for government
ownership of a firm. In the case of corporate law, Professor Barzuza claims that regulations and

this, compare two worlds in which there is a single legislator who writes the rules
for firm governance. In the first, much like modern-day Delaware, the legislator
receives a flat fee from each firm to spend on public goods; and in the second,
much like Professor Barzuza’s imagined Delaware, the legislator receives a large
percentage of firm profits (say 50%) that the legislator can dole out to
constituents. All things else being equal, it is obvious that the legislator in the
second world has a stronger incentive to increase firm value, as the benefits flow
directly to the legislator.
It is difficult to object to this claim at a theoretical level, since it may
improve incentives for legislators on the margin and if the legislators set the rate
too high or enact changes that actually destroy shareholder value, companies will
simply move to Maryland or lobby Delaware to change back. My guess is,
however, that the impact of such a dramatic3 change in tax law is likely to be
trivial (and potentially harmful for Delaware) for two reasons.
I.
First, Professor Barzuza’s proposal omits any analysis of the legislative
process that a proportional tax is designed to influence. There are two parts to
this, roughly corresponding to the supply and demand of legislation. Legislators
supply legislation, but Professor Barzuza offers no account of legislator motives
to explain why the increase in state revenues that would come from a
proportional tax would benefit the marginal Delaware legislator. On the other
side of the coin, managers are part of the demand for corporate law legislation,
but they too are missing from Professor Barzuza’s calculus. Let’s consider each of
these in turn.
A.
Professor Barzuza notes that “Delaware” will be rewarded with higher
taxes and this will encourage it to enact optimal (or more optimal) legislation.
The problem is that Delaware doesn’t act but through its legislators, and these
legislators are missing in Professor Barzuza’s account. Without a coherent claim
about how legislators respond to the various incentives created by the parties in
the legislative process, the argument she makes is less persuasive. The point here
is simply that once we move from the single-legislator example above to a multimember body, the calculus of weighing the benefits from a change in corporate
governance is more complex. For example, do legislators only care about the size
of the public fisc? Perhaps for some legislators sitting on key committees, the
ability to pass out goodies to constituents may help them get reelected, but for
others the opposite may be true. Legislators face constituencies with
heterogeneous preferences, not all of which will view increased state revenues as
taxes are compliments, not substitutes, because certain governance regulations do not lower but
rather increase firm value.
3 Professor Barzuza admits the new tax policy would be a radical change, when she claims
that the federal government might be needed to force the change on an unwilling Delaware.
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positive. Assuming that the utility function of the marginal legislator rises with
increased tax revenues seems, at the best, overly simplistic. Isn’t it just as likely
that legislators in multi-member bodies might care about maximizing other
things, for example, their likelihood of being reelected or their personal influence
or prestige? And, if this is true, what about passing shareholder-wealthmaximizing legislation increases these?
Legislators who couldn’t take credit for increased state revenues or
wouldn’t want to would not be influenced by a proportional tax. One might argue
that for the latter group that the state could use the increased cash from the taxes
raised from firms to reduce taxes on other entities, like individuals. But this
account needs a theory of why increased taxes on firms relative to individuals is
more efficient. Optimizing the mix of tax funding sources is a difficult calculation,
considering the relative ability of firms and individuals to evade taxes (say,
through structuring, compliance, or leaving the jurisdiction entirely), the impact
on incentives to produce (that is, the choice between work and consuming
leisure), the impact on other tax burdens, such as federal taxes and sales taxes,
and so on. Substituting corporate taxes for individual taxes might seem desirable,
but it could lead to unintended consequences or dry up the tax base in ways that
might be difficult to replace because of the political stickiness of tax rates for
individuals or corporations.
Another problem on the supply side is the uncertainty about incentives for
legislators to prefer tax revenues over the number of firms incorporated in
Delaware. There may in fact be an inverse correlation between the number of
charters and the maximization of revenue, and the marginal legislator might
sensibly prefer to have more companies chartered in Delaware than to maximize
the treasury (or minimize other tax burdens). Maximizing the number of firms
may mean more work for lawyers, judges, and other service providers in
Delaware, and thus increase campaign contributions to and the prestige of
legislators responsible for the attracting firms there. The public choice
calculations about what legislators maximize is far from clear and not obviously
pointed in the direction of “better” firm governance, even in a world of increased
monetary incentives for the state as a whole.
B.
Professor Barzuza’s account also leaves out managers from the legislation
process, and thus overestimates the potential impact the increased revenues will
have on overall legislative incentives. Professor Barzuza notes that managers are
powerful players in the current legislative process (in fact, strong enough to
distort it in perverse ways), but then underestimates the role they will have in
objecting to any legislation designed to increase shareholder value but that will
destroy manager value. This is especially odd, since the argument for the tax
change is premised on how powerful managers are. Why would this power to
influence legislators wane under a new tax regime? Presumably the answer is
because the legislators now have a larger incentive (because of the increased tax
revenues) to resist the managers. But one has to compare the relative impact of
3

the new tax revenues and the power of managers in the new world, and it isn’t at
all clear that the new incentives will be anywhere near high powered enough to
make a difference. If managers are powerful enough to resist improvements in
the law that would increase shareholder value as significant as Professor Barzuza
believes are possible, taxes are unlikely to do anything to change this. To see this,
consider a simple example.
Let’s say the Delaware legislature is considering a bill that would require
firms to destagger their boards. Professor Barzuza cites evidence suggesting that
this would increase shareholder value by $40 billion. We must consider the gains
to legislators from both passage and defeat of particular legislation. If the bill is
passed, Delaware’s treasury will receive $40 billion times some tax rate, T.
Legislators who vote for the bill will benefit derivatively from this, receiving some
benefit, B, for increasing state revenues. B is, by definition, less than $40 billion
times T, since the gains are divided up among many legislators, there exists some
question about which legislators get “credit” for bills, and because the money is
flowing to the state (and the people) instead of directly to the legislators
themselves.
Managers will try to influence legislators too, by delivering benefits, call
them B*, to individual legislators. We can measure the upper bound of this
influence by estimating the value managers would have from maintaining the
status quo. Professor Barzuza claims that firms, acting through managers, do not
have incentives to destagger their own boards, because managers prefer the
private benefits of control, which would be diminished if the board were
destaggered. To put a dollar amount on these private benefits, one need only
estimate the dollar gains managers would share with shareholders if the board
were destaggered. Assuming managers own, on average, 5% of firm shares, the
managers would gain about $2 billion from the change ($40 billion x 5%), and
thus the private benefits of control must exceed that amount. This means
managers would be willing to pay over $2 billion to avoid the legal change; this is
the upper limit of B*.
To determine whether legislators will have incentives to pass shareholderfriendly legislation, we simply compare B* to B. B* is likely to be much greater
than B for an individual legislator, if for no reason other than that B* is a direct
benefit, while B is an indirect one in most cases. In fact, the directness of the
benefit for legislators may be one reason why managers are able to currently
exert a disproportionate influence on legislators compared with diffuse (and
generally disinterested) shareholders.
This approach also allows us to estimate the tax rate necessary for B to
exceed B*. As noted above, the managers would be willing to “pay” $2 billion to
legislators to avoid this law to preserve their private benefits of control.4 In the
4 Managers would likely pay, say through campaign contributions, lobbying, charitable
donations, or other means, to defeat the bill. Campaign finance laws are obviously relevant here,
but managers can use a variety of mechanisms to deliver B* to legislators, including ones clearly
outside of the reach of even the toughest election laws.
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extreme, this means that the tax rate, T, would have to exceed 5% for legislators
to favor the bill. This is a ridiculously large increase in the tax rate, and one that
would not be politically feasible.
II.
Second, even assuming that these issues are solved, there remains the
question about how realistic it is for legislators to make judgments about what
does and does not increase shareholder value. At some level, this is what
legislators are supposed to do, but Delaware’s corporate code is remarkably
devoid of the governance gimmicks and the legislators have no experience in this
policy making area. The conceit of the current code is to leave it up to the parties
to contract from a bare base to those changes that will improve value. Although
the supposition that parties will actually bargain or have incentives to strike
efficient deals may be questioned, it is not at all clear that legislative incentives
are the problem. After all, how are legislators to measure the merit of various
academic studies suggesting governance improvements? The literature is rife
with claims that doing X, Y, or Z will improve shareholder value, but also
counterclaims on the merits or on theoretical grounds. Empirical scholarship is
increasingly impenetrable by non-specialists, and, in the event of hearings on the
merits of X, Y, or Z, we can be confident there will be as many adamant pros as
cons, and even more estimates on the potential impact on firm value.
In addition, there is no way for legislative judgments about the impact of
X, Y, or Z to be evaluated ex post, since numerous other variables, like general
economic conditions, competition in the industry, and other regulations, may
impact firm profitability. This means that there will be no (or a very noisy)
feedback on the efficacy of governance changes and the merits of the proportional
tax scheme. This will make legislation in subsequent periods claiming benefits to
be less certain, and it may also undermine the political support for the tax or for
particular governance changes, since causation will be so uncertain.
These problems simply raise the question of why legislators should prefer
making these judgments instead of firm owners and managers. It is unlikely that
the sum of decision costs and error costs is less for legislators/courts than for
managers/shareholders. Legislators simply have no experience doing this kind of
analysis given the history of corporate law legislation in Delaware. Moving to a
new paradigm of making governance choices will need to overcome this
deficiency in skills and information, as well as just the inertia of the current
system. This means that the incentives, especially at the beginning of the new
regime, will have to be much higher than would be necessary in equilibrium. As a
result, the political resistance to getting this plan started may be greater than
what one would think if just evaluating the steady-state case, thus making new
regime less likely than it would otherwise be if Delaware legislators routinely
made these kinds of calculations.
Unlike legislators, firm stakeholders are betting their own money, careers,
and reputations, and are likely to know the idiosyncratic circumstances of their
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firms. Firm-specific changes in governance are more likely to be narrowly
tailored to firm and/or industry circumstances, are more likely to be capable of ex
post analysis and reconciliation, and are more responsive to market forces that
will weed out good from bad governance choices. In addition, the firm may be the
only sensible locus of judging governance. Studies showing that certain
governance changes (e.g., smaller boards or separating the chair and CEO roles)
will increase firm value may be biased by omitting unobservable variables at a
firm level,5 and therefore may be yielding false results or ones that are not
generalizable across all firms.
In light of these problems, delegating this job to legislators seems sensible
only if the other mechanisms for enacting governance changes that will increase
firm value (while not doing other harms) are irretrievably broken. Instead of
giving the power to legislators, who know less than managers, shareholders, and
creditors, why not advocate repealing the Williams Act, changing the rules about
how firms repay costs in proxy battles, or any number of other reforms that
would keep the burden on firm stakeholders to make these decisions.
III.
Professor Barzuza’s insight makes an important contribution to how we
think about the interplay between taxes and regulation, and what we view as the
most appropriate ways to optimize corporate default rules. The changes she
envisions are unlikely to overcome the managerial power she presupposes,
however, and, in any event, are a clear second best to a world of few mandatory
rules and lots of freedom of contract about governance. Focusing on improving
mechanisms of private ordering seems like a more sensible way of improving
corporate governance than getting caught in legislative battles over governance.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu

See, for example, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, “Boards of Directors as
an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,” (June 15, 2000),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=233111 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.233111 (arguing that
governance is endogenous and studies claiming causal links between performance and
governance are plagued by unobserved variables).
5
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